JAMES M. BUCHANAN JR. (1919-)
Prêmio Nobel 1986
Economista norte-americano, Buchanan obteve o Prêmio Nobel de Economia em 1986 por ter desenvolvido as bases contratuais e constitucionais da teoria de decisões econômicas e políticas.
Estudou nas Universidades do Tennessee e Chicago e exerceu a docência nas Universidades de Pennsylvania e Virgínia. Especialista em Finanças Públicas, realizou estudos interessantes sobre o papel da inflação como imposto e sobre a natureza da Dívida Pública. Buchanan é líder e teórico da corrente Public Choice, que analisa de que forma são adotadas as decisões públicas que influenciam o funcionamento do sistema econômico.
Textos em espanhol de Buchanan incluídos neste CD-ROM
Buchanan, James M. ¿Pueden los "estados benefactores" en democracia sobrevivir a las crisis financieras? (PDF)
Buchanan, James M. Apatía del contribuyente, inercia institucional y crecimiento económico (PDF)
Buchanan, James M. La deuda pública y la formación de capital (PDF)
Buchanan, James M. ¿Qué deberían hacer los economistas? (PDF)
Buchanan, James M. Ensayos sobre economía política
Buchanan, James M. La perspectiva de elección pública
Outras obras:
"Individual Choice in Voting and the Market", 1954, JPE
"Social Choice in Voting and the Market", 1954, JPE
Public Principles of Public Debt, 1958.
"Positive Economics, Welfare Economics and Political Economy", 1959, J Law Econ
Fiscal Theory and Political Economy, 1960.
"Externality", with W.C. Stubblebine, 1962, Economica
The Calculus of Consent: Logical foundations for constitutional democracy, con G. Tullock, 1962.
"What Should Economists Do?", 1964, Southern EJ
"Ethical Rules, Expected Values and Large Numbers", 1965, Ethics
"Economics and Its Scientific Neighbors", 1966, in Krupp, editor, Structure of Economic Science
Public Finance in Democratic Process, 1967.
Demand and Supply of Public Goods, 1968.
"An Economist's Approach to Scientific Politics", 1968, in Parsons, editor, Perspectives in the Study of Politics.
Cost and Choice: An inquiry into economic theory, 1969.
"Is Economics the Science of Choice?", 1969, in Streissler, editor, Roads to Freedom
"Notes for an Economic Theory of Socialism", 1970, Public Choice
Academia in Anarchy, with N.Devletoglou, 1971.
"Equality as Fact and Norm", 1971, Ethics
"Before Public Choice", 1973, in Tullock, editor, Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy
The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, 1975.
"Public Finance and Public Choice", 1975, National Tax Journal
"A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory", 1975, AER
"Barro on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem", 1976, JPE
"Methods and Morals in Economics", 1976, in Breit and Culbertson, editors, Science and Ceremony
Democracy in Deficit: the political legacy of Lord Keynes, with R.E. Wagner, 1977.
"Markets, States and the Extent of Morals", 1978, AER
Freedom in Constitutional Contract, 1978.
What Should Economists Do?, 1979.
The Power to Tax: the analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution, with G. Brennan, 1980.
"The Homogenization of Heterogeneous Inputs", with R.D. Tollison, 1981, AER
"The Domain of Subjective Economics: Between predictive science and moral philosophy", 1982, in Kirzner, editor, Method, Process and Austrian Economics
"Order Defined in the Process of Emergence", 1982, Literature of Liberty
The Reason of Rules: constitutional political economy with G. Brennan, 1985.
Liberty, Market and the State, 1986.
Economics: between predictive science and moral philosophy, with G. Brennan, 1988.
Explorations in Constitutional Economics, 1989.
The Economics and Ethics of Constitutional Order, 1991.