ROBERT J. AUMANN (1930-)
Robert Aumann é considerado um dos teóricos mais destacados da Teoria de Jogos. Aumann, junto com Thomas Schelling, ganhou o Prêmio Nobel "por ter ampliado a compreensão do conflito e da cooperação mediante a análise da Teoria de Jogos".
Judeu, nascido em Frankfurt, Alemanha, Aumann emigrou para os Estados Unidos onde obteve o doutorado em matemática, em 1955, pelo Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Atualmente, trabalha na Universidade Hebraica de Jerusalém. Ele tem a dupla nacionalidade norte-americana e israelense.
A partir de 1959 ele passou a desenvolver estudos sobre a Teoria dos Jogos ao analisar as diferenças entre os jogos com repetição finita e infinita. Em 1960, com Bezalel Peleg, formalizou a noção de jogo de coalizões sem transferência de utilidade. Em 1963, com Michael Maschleri, introduziu o conceito de "bargaining set". Em 1974, identificou o "equilíbrio correlacionado" em jogos bayesianos. Em 1975, demonstrou o teorema de convergência para o valor de Shapley. Em 1976, definiu formalmente o conceito de "conhecimento comum".
Para Robert Aumann a teoria dos jogos é "a teoria mais geral" da ciência econômica.
Se você deseja parabenizá-lo diretamente mande um e-mail para:raumann@math.huji.ac.il.
OBRAS
"Acceptable Points in General Cooperative n-Person Games", 1959, in Contributions to the Theory of Games IV, Annals of Math. Study
"Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games Without Side Payments" with B. Peleg, 1960, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society.
"Acceptable Points in Games of Perfect Information", 1960, Pacific Journal of Mathematics
"Linearity of Unrestrictedly Transferable Utilities", 1960, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly
"Spaces of Measurable Transformations", 1960, Bulletin of AMS
"The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments", 1961, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society
"Almost Strictly Competitive Games", 1961, Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
"Utility Theory Without the Completeness Axiom", 1962, Econometrica.
"A Definition of Subjective Probability" with F.J. Anscombe, 1963, Annals of Mathematical Statistics
"The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games", with M. Maschler, 1964, in Advances in Game Theory,
"Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Games", 1964, in Advances in Game Theory.
Values of Non-Atomic Games, with L.S. Shapley, 1964.
"Markets with a Continuum of Traders", 1964, Econometrica.
"A Variational Problem Arising in Economics", with M. Perles, 1965, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications.
"Integrals of Set-Valued Functions", 1965, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications.
"A Method of Computing the Kernel of n-Person Games", with B. Peleg and P. Rabinovitz, 1965, Mathematics of Computation.
"Game-Theoretic Aspects of Gradual Disarmament", with M. Maschler, 1966, Mathematica
"Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium in Markets with a Continuum of Traders", 1966, Econometrica.
"A Survey of Cooperative Games Without Side Payments", 1967, in Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern.
"Random Measure Preserving Transformations", 1967, in Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium.
"Measurable Utility and the Measurable Choice Theorem", 1969, in La D&eacut;cision.
"Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle" with M. Maschler, 1972, Management Science.
"Disadvantegous Monopolies", 1973, JET.
"Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies", 1974, JMathE.
Values of Non-Atomic Games, with L.S. Shapley, 1974.
"A Note on Gale's Example", with B. Peleg, 1974, JMathE.
"Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures", with J. Dréze, 1975, International Journal of Game Theory.
"Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders", 1975, Econometrica.
"An Elementary Proof that Integration Preserves Uppersemicontinuity", 1976, JMathE.
"Agreeing to Disagree", 1976, Annals of Statistics.
"Solution Notions for Continuingly Competitive Situations", with L.S. Shapley, 1976.
"Orderable Set Functions and Continuity III: Orderability and Absolute Continuity", with Uri Rothblum, 1977, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization.
"The St. Petersburg Paradox: A Discussion of some Recent Comments", 1977, JET.
"Power and Taxes", with M. Kurz, 1977, Econometrica.
"Core and Value for a Public Goods Economy: An example", with R.J. Gardner and R.W. Rosenthal, 1977, JET.
"On the Rate of Convergence of the Core", 1979, IER.
"Recent Developments in the Theory of the Shapley Value", 1978, in Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians.
"Survey of Repeated Games", 1981, in Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern
"Approximate Purification of Mixed Strategies", with Katznelson, Radner, Rosenthal and Weiss, 1983, Mathematics of Operations Research
"Voting for Public Goods", with M. Kurz and A. Neyman, 1983, RES.
"An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value", 1985, Econometrica.
"Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud", with M. Maschler, 1985, JET.
"What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish?", 1985, in Arrow and Honkaphola, editors, Frontiers in Economics.
"On the Non-Transferable Utility Value: A Comment on the Roth-Shafer Examples", 1985, Econometrica.
"Values of Markets with Satiation or Fixed Prices", with J. Dréze, 1986, Econometrica.
"Game Theory", 1987, in New Palgrave.
"Power and Public Goods", with M. Kurz and A. Neyman, 1987, JET.
"Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality", 1987, Econometrica.
"Endogenous Formation of Links between Players and of Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley value", with R.B. Myerson 1988, in Roth, editor, The Shapley Value.
"Cooperation and Bounded Recall", with S. Sorin, 1989, GamesEB.
Lectures on Game Theory, 1989.
"Nash Equilibria are Not Self-Enforcing", 1990, in Gabszewicz et al, editors, Economic Decision-Making
"Irrationality in Game Theory", 1992, in Dasgupta et al, editors, Economic Analysis of Markets and Games, Essays in Honor of Frank Hahn.
"Long-Term Competition: A game-theoretic analysis", with L.S. Shapley, 1994, in Gale et al, editors, Essays in Game Theory
"Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality", 1995, GamesEB.
Repeated Games of Incomplete Information with M. Maschler, 1995.